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STATE OF UTAH and
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vs
RAY WILLIS REEVES,Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The State of Utah appeals from an order against it on
an Order to Show Cause in Re Temporary Support brought by the
State of Utah and entered in the District Court of the Third
Judicial District, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, denying the
State of Utah full reimbursement for the total sum of assistance
payments expended by the State.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court ordered that the Respondent had no
duty to totally reimburse the State of Utah for public assistance
payments made to Margaret B. Reeves without a prior order of the
court.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the decision of the District
Court affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, Margaret B. Reeves, married Ray W. Reeves
on or about August 16, 1974 (R. 1 ) . Less than two months later
Margaret and Ray Reeves separated, which separation occurred on
or about October 14, 197 4.

On December 18, 197 4, Margaret Reeves

filed a Verified Complaint in which she sought a divorce from Ray
Reeves.

Margaret Reeves, in her complaint, waived her right to

alimony and claimed the defendant to be the father of her then
expected child (R. 1 ) . In the answer of the defendant, Ray Reeves
admitted that Margaret was not entitled to alimony and denied the
paternity of the child of Margaret Reeves and any obligation of
support that would follow thereafter (R.6).
In January, 1975, Margaret Reeves began receiving public
assistance payments and has received such payments through January,
1976.

An assignment of collection was executed on July 15, 1975,

by which Margaret Reeves subrogated her rights to collection of
any moneys expended by the State to the Department of Social
Services (R. 12). After receiving notice in late August of 1975
from the Department of Social Services that the Department was
making public assistance payments to Margaret Reeves and her child,
the defendant made a payment of $37.50 to the Department of
Social Services (R. 17). Because of the financial position of
-2-

the defendant and the belief of the defendant that he was not
the father of the child, the defendant paid only $37.50 to the
State and protested the amounts which his estranged wife and
alleged child were receiving.
The State of Utah, rather than proceeding by administrative action, attempted to seek reimbursement of the moneys which
it had expended in support of Margaret Reeves and her child, by
bringing an order to show cause in re temporary support and motion
for judgment against the defendant on or about February 20, 1976,
in the Third District Court.

The State requested judgment for the

total of $2,418.00, which moneys the State had paid in public
assistance to Margaret Reeves and her child.
The lower court took testimony as to the financial
condition of the defendant and was made aware of the question of
the paternity of the child in this matter; and after such testimony
awarded the Utah State Department of Social Services the sum of
$457.50 for unpaid support and denied the State judgment for
assistance payments given the wife without a prior order of the
court (R. 23-28).
POINT 1
THE STATE OF UTAH IS AN IMPROPER PARTY TO THIS ACTION.
Margarpt Reeves commenced a divorce action against Ray
Reeves pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 19 53, §30-3-1 as amended.
As such the only parties in interest are Ray Reeves and Margaret
-3-

Reeves.

The State of Utah, in seeking reimbursement from Ray

Reeves for payments paid by the State of Utah to Margaret Reeves
in the form of public assistance payments, has attempted to join
in that divorce proceeding by bringing an order to show cause in
re temporary support; and also in that order attempted by motion
to obtain a judgment against the Respondent for all sums paid by
the State to or on behalf of Margaret Reeves.
There is no statutory basis or common law basis for
allowing the State of Utah to enter into a divorce action prior
to a final decree to allow the State to seek reimbursement for
moneys it has expended in public assistance payments to an
individual.

The State has, however, determined itself to be a

real party in interest and brought the proceedings to obtain
temporary support as well as reimbursement.

Such an action is

unwarranted and without precedent.
As Justice Tuckett noted in his concurring opinion in
Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238 (1976), when the Utah
Department of Social Services intervened in an action after the
Decree of Divorce had been entered:
"I find no basis in law for such intervention.
It goes without saying that the State could not
have intervened in divorce proceedings filed by
the plaintiff . . . there is no provision for
expansion by any third person, and I find no legal
basis for permitting the State to intervene after
judgment." Id. at 241.
The State has attempted to intervene in a divorce proceeding
filed by the plaintiff.
-4-

There has been no Decree entered nor any orders
entered prior to the proceedings brought by the State of Utah
in this action.

There may possibly be a right for the State to

intervene after a decree of divorce has been entered into, as was
the case in Bartholomew, supra.

However, where there is not

yet a decree of divorce, they have no right to intervene in the
manner in which they did in the present case.

The State of Utah

could not intervene by right or by permissive intervention under
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 24 provides

in part:
" (a) Invervention of Right. Upon timely
application anyone shall be permitted to intervene
in an action: (1) when a statute confers an
unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the
representation of the applicant's interest by
existing parties is or may be inadequate and the
applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the
action; or (3) when the applicant is so situated
as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property which is in the
custody or subject to the control or disposition
of the court or an officer thereof.
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely
application anyone may be permitted to intervene
in an action: (1) when a statute confers a
conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an
applicant's claim or defense and the main action
have a question of law or fact in common."
There is no statutory right entitling the State to enter
into a divorce action nor will the State be adversely affected by
either an order for temporary support or a decree of divorce.
State is seeking a judgment against the Respondent which is an
-5-

The

action separate and apart from this divorce action.

The State of

Utah should proceed with a separate action against the defendant
rather than clutter up the present divorce with the motions and
proceedings which the State has brought in this case.
In Baggs v. Anderson (Utah, 1974) 528 P.2d 141, a case
involving a collection of child support payments, this Court held
that when a person furnished support to a child, that person
then has the right to collect reimbursement from the parent, the
same as any other debt.

The State of Utah should proceed in an

action to collect a debt, rather than intervene in a divorce
proceeding as it has done in this case.
The Elizabethian Poor Laws were enacted in England in
the very early Seventeenth Century, which gave an individual the
right to reimbursement for payments furnished to another person's
wife and/or children.

The right granted to the individual who

furnished the necessities to a wife and/or family when the husband
failed to. provide for them was an action at law independent of
any other action.
There has been no right at common law to enter into a
divorce proceeding between the parties, but there was an action
separate and apart from the divorce proceedings to collect the
moneys expended by an individual who paid the necessities of the
needy wife and/or family.
The State should proceed in an action separate from the
-6-

present divorce proceeding to collect the moneys which it claims
the Respondent owes to the State:
POINT II
AN ORDER MUST ISSUE FROM THE DISTRICT COURT BEFORE THE
STATE IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF SUPPORT PAYMENTS.
The direct issue before the Court is whether the State
is entitled to leimbursement for public assistance moneys rendered
to a wife and her child without a Court determination, a Court
order, or an administrative proceeding.
The State in this matter contends that a husband must
reimburse the State for all moneys that it paid in public
assistance payments to a wife and/or child, whether or not the
husband can afford to make such payments to the State; and before
a husband has ever been afforded his due process rights to a notice
and hearing.

Such a holding would mean that any amount that the

State has paid to a person's spouse and family must be paid back
to the State without any determination as to whether or not the
spouse should be held accountable for such sums.
Such a holding would not facilitate equity in any
proceeding against the husband in such circumstances.

In the

case of San Bernardino County v. McCall, 132 P.2d 65, 56 C.A.
2d 99 (1973), in a proceeding whereby the County attempted
to compel the defendant to reimburse the County for aid
which the County had furnished to the defendant's parents
and for an order further requiring the defendant to
-7-

contribute to the support of his parents in the future, the Court
held that it was the body to determine what amounts, if any, the
State would be reimbursed for the aid which it had given. The
County in that action had a statutory scale set up for guidance
set by the Board of Supervisors in fixing liability of responsible
relatives.

The Court determined that the amount of liability of

a person was a question of fact for the trial court to determine
rather than having a set fee established with no variances whatsoever.

The Court further held in that case where the individual

did not have the ability to contribute to his parents' support,
that individual did not have to reimburse the State for moneys
which it expended in the support of his parents.
The Respondent in this matter has very minimal resources,
as was noted to the Trial Court and the other counsel in this action.
The defendant has either had low-paying jobs or has been without
work for extended periods of time throughout the past few years.
The State in this matter has attempted to set mandatory
reimbursement requirements upon the defendant, as was also
attempted in San Bernardino County v. McCall, supra, without any
consideration as to defendant's ability to pay support payments.
The Trial Court, as the determiner of fact in such proceedings as
this, determines what amounts were due to the State in this action.
The Court in this matter was made aware of the status and situation
of the Respondent before it made its determination as to the amount
of responsibility of the Respondent.

Being cognizant of these

facts, the Court acted correctly in making its award to the State
and the Court did not act arbitrarily in its decision.
-8

A husband has the duty to support his wife and child as
defined in 78-45-3, Utah Code Annotated.

However, the District

Court has jurisdiction of all proceedings under the Uniform Civil
Liability for Support Act, which is contained in 78-45-1, Utah
Code Annotated, et seq.

Though there is a duty of support, no

amount may be due or owing to be reimbursed to any individual for
another party until an order is issued by the Court,
The Court determines what amount is to be paid as support
by considering the factors enumerated in 78-45-7, Utah Code
Annotated, plus any other relevant factors that the Court deems
necessary.

After such a determination an order is issued by the

Court for the obligor to pay the support owing.

The State of

Utah in this case is attempting to obviate any court action and
have all the moneys which it dispenses to a mother and her child
as moneys which the husband must reimburse to the State.

Such an

action is inconsistent with the statutory language in 78-45-1,
Utah Code Annotated, et seq. and 78-45b-l, et seq.
Utah Code Annotated, §78-45-1 through 8, places all of
the responsibilities as to support in the hands of the District
Court for its determination.

78-45-9, Utah Code Annotated,

provides that the obligee may enforce his right under Chapter 45b
of Title 78, Utah Code Annotated, but upon reading that section
which pertains directly with the support of children, it is easily
determined that an order must issue from the District Court as to
-9-

what amounts the obligor must pay.

78-45b-4, Utah Code Annotated,

reads in part as follows:
". . .department may issue a notice of a support
debt accrued or accruing based upon any court
order."
Under that provision the Court order must first have
been issued before the State can attempt reimbursement.

Even

when examining 78-45b-5, Utah Code Annotated, which states:
"In the absence of a court order, the director
may issue notice of a support debt accrued or
accruing based upon furnishing of support by the
department for the benefit of any dependent child."
no ability is given to the director to assess what amounts an
individual owes, just that moneys are being expended on that
individual's behalf.
The director, in such a circumstance, may give notice that
a debt is accruing.

However, it is the Trial Court that determines

what amount of reimbursement the State shall be entitled to.

No-

where in any of these sections does it state that an individual is
to pay the State for all moneys the State spends.

Total

reimbursement to the State by one who is a pauper works an injustice
upon that individual who has no ability to even furnish the
lecessities of life to himself, much less to any one else.
The State would have this Court hold that when it serves
notice to an individual that public assistance payments are being
^aaae for ardon behalf of that individual, that that individual
vouid then become liable for all moneys expended by the State.
-10-

In the case of Mallett v. Luihn, 294 P. 2d 871, 206 Or.
678 (1956), a case involving an action by the Welfare Commission
against a relative of the needy person, whereby the Commission
sought to recover its moneys which it had expended to provide for
the needy relative in that case, the Court stated that after notice
is sent to an individual to add to his responsibility to care for
a needy relative, that individual denies liability, and a hearing
is set by the Commission, the Commission after determining
liability of the individual of the needy relative, that individual
may then apply to the District Court for a trial court determination
as to what moneys it is responsible to the Commission for its support
of the needy relative.
In the case before the Court, the defendant was notified
in late August, 1975, that the State was making pyblic assistance
payments to the estranged wife of the defendant.

After such

notification the defendant denied any liability to the State for
the payments which it had made to defendant's wife.

The State

then set the hearing before the Third District Court by bringing
an order to show cause in re temporary support for and in behalf
of the plaintiff, Margaret B. Reeves.
As in the Oregon case, a determination was made on the
merits by the Judge, after which the Judge awarded the State $495.00
less previous payments made by the defendant.

The Court further

ordered that the defendant pay $50.00 per month as child support.
-11-

Such acts of the Court were within its discretion.

The Court had

jurisdiction in this matter which the State had placed itself under
when it brought the action for the temporary support payments and
its motion for payments to reimburse the State for the public
assistance payments made to the plaintiff.
Appellant, in its brief, cites Los Angeles County v.
Frisbie, 122 P.2d 526, 19 C a h

634 (1942) as standing for the

proposition that there is no need to go into Court for reimbursement based on the statute.

In the above

cited case the County was

seeking reimbursement from a relative of a pauper to whom the
County had furnished aid.

The Court in interpreting the Welfare

and Institutions Code of California, noted that reimbursement was
to be accomplished in one of two ways —

both of which dictated

that the County bring an action in Court after which the Court, not
the County, would determine the amount of liability of the indigent's
relatives.

The Court was to determine liability and financial

ability in the proceedings brought by the Court.
The California Code gave the County the right to proceed
against the indigent's relative in one section and the jurisdiction
of the Court in another.

The Utah Code gives the State the

right

to proceed against the non-supporting party in one section and
gives the Court jurisdiction in another in a similar concept as
the California Code.

The County, in Los Angeles County v. Frisbie,

supra, attempted to have the Court grant it judgment for all
-12-

moneys it had given to the indigent in that case against the
relative, but the Court stated that when it was given jurisdiction
by statute, as the Utah Court is given, it is the body to
determine what the liability is of the relative, and not the
County.
In the action before this Court, the Appellant would
have the State Department of Social Services determine the amount
of liability of an individual regardless of any Court order or
administrative procedure or of the individual's financial ability.
In Family Law by C. Clinton Clod, Harry W. Halstead and Donald W.
Crocker (1964), American Law Institute, 3rd Ed., it states that
an action for support between a husband and wife ". . .could be
brought in any Civil Court", at 109.

As noted in that text, an

action for support is an in persona action or sometimes, in rem.
Nowhere in the text does it suggest that the action is solely an
administrative determination without a hearing as the Appellant
would ask this Court to so hold.
Two other points are made by the authors of Family Law:
(1)

The obligation to support may be enforced in favor of a spouse

in any Court and state that has jurisdiction over the defendant,
which is also established in 78-45-6, Utah Code Annotated; and
(2)

It is up to the Court to fix the amount of support.
The State in this matter would seek to circumvent both of

the established requirements.

The State, after paying public
-13-

assistance is attempting to declare such payments as a judgment,
rather than a debt, and then ask the Court to enforce its judgment,
rather than have the Court fix the amount of support.
the law in this State.

Such is not

The statutory language of Utah Code

Annotated, 78-45-7, as previously noted, gives the Court the
ability to determine what amounts are due or should be paid by
a husband to support his wife and children.

Even the treatise of

William J. Brockbank and Felix Infausto, Interstate Enforcement of
Family Support (the Runaway Pappy Act), 2nd Ed., notes that there
is a duty to support one's spouse but that the amount of obligation
arises only upon litigation.

(Id. pages 32-42)

The Respondent does not deny that there is a duty to
support one's wife and children.

Such a duty was first established

by the Elizabethian Poor Laws and in this State by statute.
However, a person or party who furnishes support to a husband's wife
and children must bring an action at law or in equity to seek
reimbursement and only after the Court has been presented with the
facts before it can the Court then issue an order for reimbursement
and/or future obligations.

The District Court, after being

presented with a question of a debt for which the state was
seeKing reimbursement, determined what amount the defendant was
to reimburse the State.

Such a determination was not an arbitrary

or capricious determination, but one determined on a reasonable
basis.
78-45-1 and 78-45b-l, Utah Code Annotated, et seq, set
-14-

two separate and distinct standards —

one which directly applies

to a wife and child, and the latter section directly with child
support.

The District Court noted the distinction in the proceed-

ings brought by the State and after due deliberation and testimony
awarded the State the moneys for which it should be reimbursed.
The Trial Court acted reasonably in determining what
amounts the State was entitled to,

The Trial Court further acted

properly in determining that it was the trier in the case and not
the Utah State Department of Social Services; and that as the
trier, only after it had made its determination and decree would
the defendant be liable for support of his wife and alleged child.
Only after an order has issued from the District Court who has
determined the liability of a father in such a case is the State
entitled to reimbursement of payment which it has made to a
husband's wife and children.

The District Court properly made such

a determination in this matter and denied the State the relief
sought.
Notice and hearing are due process requirements which must
be met by this State before it can impose any obligation upon the
defendant in this matter.

The State chose to proceed before the

District Court, who did impose certain liabilities and responsibilities upon the defendant.

The obligations which the District Court

imposed were proper under the circumstances.
-15-

POINT III
A HUSBAND WITH MEAGER MEANS OF SUPPORT SHOULD NOT BE
REQUIRED TO EXPEND ALL OF HIS RESOURCES SUPPORTING OTHERS.
The Respondent was receiving approximately a gross
income of $300.00 per month (T.2) at the time of the hearing.
The Respondent has had no training nor skill in any trade or
profession and is in a low employability classification (T.2).
He is very often unemployed because of his lack of skill and
training and at the present time he is unemployed, having been
dismissed from his past job.

Nonethelessr the State would ask

that this individual reimburse the State for the public assistance
payments which it has paid to his wife and alleged child, when the
Respondent is hardly in any position to meet the temporary support
payments ordered by the District Court, as well as his own monthly
expenses.

To saddle a person with an obligation that is minimal

to many people but to the Respondent, whose means are very minimal,
is too great a burden.
In Family Law, Id., which was published in 1964, the
authors noted that a household that was existing on $3 50.00 per
month under one roof would need not less than $450.00 to $475.00
per month when living apart.

The authors1 solution in the matter

was for the wife to get a job, otherwise the State would have a
husband on welfare as well as the wife.
The statute 7 8-45-7, Utah Code Annotated, states that the
Court must determine what amount should be paid an individual as
-16-

support.

The Court uses equity to make its determination and

equity should be used in the present case.

In Selected Problems

in Family Law and Poverty, 2nd Ed. (1973) by Conrad Poison, the
author states that:
"The assumption of both our welfare law and
alimony law that upon marriage a husband is saddled
with a life-long duty to support a wife or exwife
who does not remarry is most questionable in any age
when women clamored for more and achieved equality.
The present assumption makes women more equal than
equal. Even if the husband's obligations conditioned
upon the actual need and ability to pay, the assumed
obligation is questionable. It is an instant of
status, rather than a contract." At 4 43.
The author further notes.
"In the case of the more prosperous, the
husband's duty to support or to pay alimony may be
an unpleasant but tolerable burden, but where a poor
or low-income husband, even a minimal offer may
constitute a great hardship or impossible burden.
. . . Often forced the man into defiance of the law
to prevent him from living in dignity." At 443.
The Respondent is without means to reimburse the State
and to force him in such a situation would create a great hardship
upon him.

The Court has stated that what it attempts to do in a

divorce proceeding is to set the parties in a position where they
can start again, in a fresh and new beginning, ". . .So that the
parties can reconstruct their lives in the most happy and useful
manner".

Cox v. Cox (Utah, 1975) 532 P.2d 994.
To place the burden which the State is attempting to put

upon the Respondent would prevent him from starting a fresh, new
life.

Equity would dictate that he should not be saddled with

such a burden in his present situation.
-17-

CONCLUSION
The Respondent is an individual of minimal resources.
The State should not be allowed to compoetely exhaust what small
amounts of income this Respondent has by allowing an "automatic"
judgment against the Respondent for funds expended by the State
in payments to the Respondent's wife and alleged child.

Clearly

this is not the intent of the Legislature in enacting the statutes.
The State of Utah should proceed in an action at law
to collect what monies it may be entitled to for its expenditures
to the Respondent's estranged wife and alleged child.

The State

should be precluded from entering into the divorce action of the
parties and the State should only be awarded judgment or be
entitled to any monies only by order and award of the Trial Court.
Respectfully submitted,
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
RANDY S. LUDLOW
Attorneys for Respondent

